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Abstract: This paper analyses the effects of involuntary excess reserves on bankers’ 
remuneration and the penalty associated with bank risk-taking if discovered. The study finds 
that involuntary excess reserves help conceal tail risks, improves bankers’ performance and 
remuneration. However, the risks once discovered result in heavy penalties on bankers’ 
remuneration. The study extends the agency theory to the context where banks hold large 
involuntary excess reserves. 
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1. Introduction 
Policy makers, bank supervisors and academics widely acknowledge that remuneration 
schemes put in place by banks can provide incentives to exploit deficiencies in internal 
controls to enhance the short-term bank performance often tied to remuneration (Kashyap et 
al., 2008; Ellul and Yarramilli, 2013). While bank remuneration is hotly debated in both 
academic and practitioner milieu in advanced market economies such as US and UK, 
relatively little is known in an emerging market environment where involuntary excess 
reserves
1
 are present. Recent literature on excess reserves have focused on the implications of 
involuntary accumulation of liquid reserves on risk-taking behaviours of commercial banks 
and effectiveness of monetary policy (see Agenor and Aynaoui, 2010; Nguyen and Boateng, 
2013, 2015). These studies document that banks with large involuntary excess reserves tend 
to take more risks and are more vulnerable to tightening monetary policy shocks. This is 
against the backdrop that excess reserves literature indicates that, involuntary excess reserves 
                                                          
1
 current account holdings with the central banks beyond statutory required and precautionary 
levels (Agenor et al., 2004) 
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provide a latitude for banks to conceal tail risks, that is, the kinds of risks that generate severe 
adverse consequences with small probability of being detected but, in return, offer generous 
compensation the rest of the time (Rajan, 2006). It is therefore argued that, the abundance of 
unwarranted liquidity may not only exacerbate risk-taking behaviour and exert positive effect 
on bankers’ remuneration but may also facilitate the concealment of tail risks. This is because 
banks with large involuntary excess reserves may engender bank risk taking, enhance short-
term bank performance which is often linked to bankers’ remuneration. 
This paper is the first attempt to examine the impact of involuntary excess reserves on 
bankers’ remuneration and the extent to which involuntary excess reserves can facilitate the 
concealment of tail risk. The study has major contributions on two fronts. First, the study 
extends principal-agent theories to the context where banks hold large involuntary excess 
reserves to clarify the incentive for bankers to take tail risks. We argue that, due to principal-
agent problem, bankers may take advantage of involuntary excess reserves and its ability to 
conceal risks easily to enhance bankers’ performance, thereby improving bankers’ 
remuneration. Second, the study sheds lights on the relationship between risk and 
remuneration management of Chinese banks which hold large involuntary excess reserves. 
We contend that risks that cannot be concealed by involuntary excess reserves may result in 
heavy penalties to bankers’ remuneration. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the context and 
theoretical background of the study. Section 3 discusses research methodology and data 






2. Context and Theoretical Background  
2.1 Involuntary Excess Reserves in China 
We choose China as the research context as a large amount of excess reserves has been 
accumulated in the Chinese banking system over the past decades, resulted mainly from the 
large capital inflows and trade surplus (Bouvatier, 2010). The aggregate excess reserves in 
the Chinese banking system accounted around 10% of deposits during 1990s and early 2000s 
(Anderson, 2009). Although this ratio gradually fell down to 3.3% in 2012, it is still 
considered high compared to that of banks in the U.S. and European countries (Anderson, 
2009; Nguyen and Boateng, 2015).  
2.2 Background Literature 
Acharya and Naqvi (2012) developed the excess liquidity theory to analyse how agency 
problems affect the aggressive lending behaviours of banks in an environment where banks 
are awash with liquidity. It is argued that excess liquidity creates the condition where 
illiquidity risk becomes less likely, thereby making tail risks easier to be concealed (Agenor 
et al., 2004; Rajan, 2006; Nguyen and Boateng, 2013; 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015). Acharya 
and Naqvi (2012) posit that bankers’ remuneration is an increasing function of loan volume 
but negatively related to the tail risks that bankers take. As the latter can be verified by costly 
audit process, banks find it optimal to carry out auditing only when liquidity shortfall reaches 
a certain alarming threshold (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012).  
As involuntary excess reserves are deemed unwanted liquidity or excess liquidity condition 
(Agenor et al., 2004), and consistent with prior literature, we contend that the presence of 
involuntary excess reserves creates the perception of low illiquidity risk probability and 
conceals easily potential tail risks, hence, enhances bankers’ performance. We therefore 
hypothesise that involuntary excess reserves have a positive impact on bankers’ remuneration 
and that the tail risks are unlikely to be concealed resulting in severe consequences. The 
 4 
 
above hypothesis is in line with the recent findings of Nguyen and Boateng (2013, 2015) who 
demonstrated that tightening monetary policy reduces banks’ holding of involuntary excess 
reserves, making them less capable of concealing risks, and as the results, their risks 
materialise rapidly and severely. This point supports the conclusion drawn by Rajan (2006) 
who notes that tail risks have low probability of being discovered but result in severe 
consequences. We argue that, the tail risks that cannot even be concealed in the context 
where involuntary excess reserves are present tend to result in severe consequences. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that risk has a negative impact on remuneration, and that the 
interaction of risk and involuntary excess reserves has a significantly negative impact on 
bankers’ remuneration. 
3. Methodology and Data  
3.1 Data 
We collect banking data from Fitch’s International Bank Database (Bankscope) for the period 
from 2000 to 2013. We only include banks whose data are available for at least three 
consecutive years. We only consider commercial banks, other types of banks (policy banks, 
cooperative banks and investment banks) are excluded as they may pursue different 
objectives rather than profitability. The final sample consists of 72 banks with 334 annual 
observations. Macro data are collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
3.2 Econometric Model 
Following Acharya and Naqvi (2012), we use the following model to capture the impact of 
involuntary excess reserves on bankers’ remuneration: 
1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 , 1 6 1 7 1it i i t i t i t i t i t i t t t itREM REM GL IER RISK IER RISK ROA GDP                          
We measure involuntary excess reserves (IER) as the difference between actual excess 
reserves that banks hold and predicted excess reserves (Nguyen and Boateng, 2013, 2015). 
Following the models of Agenor et al. (2004), Aikaeli (2011), and Nguyen and Boateng 
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(2013, 2015), excess reserve is regressed on its first lag, loan return volatility, cash-holding 
preference of depositors, reserve requirement ratios, penalty rate on reserve shortage, and real 
GDP growth rate to capture the economy’s demand for cash. System Generalised Method of 
Moments (SGMM) developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995); 
Blundell and Bond (1998) is used as endogeneity problems exists in the model of excess 
reserves. Involuntary excess reserves are collected as residuals of the regressions. The 
regression model for excess reserves is reported in Appendix 1. 
Bankers’ remuneration (REM) is measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. 
Personnel expenses include wages and salaries, social security costs, pension expenses and 
other personnel costs, including the expensing of staff stock options. Acharya and Naqvi 
(2012) argue that bankers are remunerated on the basis of loan volume they generated (GL) 
and risks that they take (RISK). Loan volume (GL) is measured as the log of gross loans. The 
risks (RISK) is indexed alternatively by non-performing loan ratio (NPL) measured as a ratio 
of non-performing loans to gross loans, and by loan loss provision ratio (LLP) measured as a 
ratio of loan loss provision to net interest revenue. To capture the profit, return on assets 
(ROA) is used. To ensure the robustness, return on equity (ROE) is also employed in 
separated regressions. The model also include real GDP growth rate (GDP) to reflect 
economic conditions. Table 1 summarises the statistics for the variables. All the variables are 
stationary. SGMM is employed for the estimations of bankers’ remuneration to address the 







Table 1: Summary Statistics for Bankers’ Remuneration Regression Variables 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Jarque-
bera 
REM 0.006 0.002 0.847 1.341 0.002 0.014 88.82* 
GL 10.752 2.019 0.486 0.248 5.447 16.11 28.17* 
NPLR 0.025 0.04 3.965 20.584 0 0.38 1100* 
LLPR 0.147 0.128 -0.32 7.835 -0.78 0.67 17549* 
IER 0 0.049 0.553 3.371 -0.192 0.2332 281.9* 
ROA 0.009 0.006 -1.218 11.728 -0.042 0.03 3733* 
ROE 0.144 0.133 -6.257 98.041 -0.668 0.83 250000* 
GDP 0.099 0.019 0.939 0.624 0.077 0.142 1.629 
Note:  * denotes the rejection of normal distribution at the 1% significance level         
4 Estimation Results and Robustness Tests 
The regression results are reported in Table 2. We find involuntary excess reserves have a 
significant positive impact on bankers’ remuneration. This supports the hypothesis that 
involuntary excess reserves help conceal tail risks, enhance bankers’ performance, and hence, 
increase bankers’ remuneration. On the other hand, discovered risks have a negative 
relationship with remuneration. This is in line with the argument of Acharya and Naqvi (2012) 
that bankers receive penalty on the risks they take. The interaction of involuntary excess 
reserves and risk is negative. The negative impact is statistically significant at the level of 5% 
when loan loss provision is used to index risk, and becomes more significant at the level of 1% 
for the case of non-performing loan as an index of risk. This implies that, in the presence of 
involuntary excess reserves, bankers are penalised more heavily for the discovered risks. This 
supports the hypothesis that the tail risks that cannot be concealed by involuntary excess 






Table 2: Bankers’ Remuneration Regression Results 
Dependent variable: 
REM 





































































No. of observations 334 334 313 313 
No. of banks 72 72 71 71 
No. of instruments 50 37 68 65 
Hansen p-value 0.808 0.424 865 0.658 
Note: 1. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
To ensure the robustness of the results, bank ownership structure (state-owned banks, non-
state-owned banks and foreign banks) is included to capture the differences in funding 
sources, operational strategies, technology, efficiency and political intervention (Tabak et al., 
2010). In addition, regional real GDP growth rates are used instead of national real GDP 
growth rates for rural and city commercial banks which tend to operate within their 
corresponding provinces (Xu, 2011). Finally, a crisis dummy variable (prior to 2008, and 
from 2008 afterwards) is included to account for any possible effects from the subprime 
crisis. All the robustness test results are consistent with that of the main regressions. The 




This study examines the impact of involuntary excess reserves on bankers’ remuneration in 
China. The study finds that involuntary excess reserves help conceal tail risks, and hence, 
improving bankers’ performance and bankers’ remuneration. However, the risks that are 
discovered result in heavy penalties on bankers’ remuneration. The results suggest that 
bankers have incentive to conceal tail risk to enhance their remuneration in an environment 
where large involuntary excess reserves have been accumulated in the banking system. It is 
suggested that Chinese central bank should reduce banks’ holdings of involuntary excess 
reserves which have detrimental consequences for financial stability as they provide 
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Appendix 1: Involuntary Excess Reserves Measurement 
Following Agenor et al. (2004), and Nguyen and Boateng (2013, 2015), we estimate the 
demand for precautionary excess reserves from the following model, and the residuals (ε) are 
considered involuntary excess reserves. 
1 , 1 2 3 4 5 6( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it i t itER ER L LR L CASH L GDP L RRR L R                
where   is a constant term, it is a well-behaved error term and ( )j L are lag polynomials. 
Variable Description Measurement 
ER Excess reserves Ratio of the difference between a bank’s current account 
balance with the central bank and required reserve over 
total customer deposit. 
LR Loan return volatility Deviation of the ratio loan interest income over total 
deposits from its trend identified by the filter method 
developed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) 
CASH Loan loss provision 
ratio 
Deviation of the ratio of vault cash over total deposits 
from its trend, estimated by Hodrick-Prescott (1997) 
GDP Real GDP growth 
rate 
Real GDP growth rate 
RRR Reserve requirement 
ratio 
Average reserve requirement ratio with a certain year 
R Penalty rate Refinance rate which the Chinese central bank charges 
on 20-day call loans 
 
